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This paper describes some supply chain theory using a case study based on a large coal export 
supply network in Australia, namely the Hunter Valley Coal Chain. This involves the supply 
of coal by road and rail from some 30 mines scattered around the Hunter Valley to the Port of 
Newcastle for loading onto very large bulk carrying ships. Due to severe constraints on the 
capacity of the infrastructure involved, highly competitive adversarial and destructive 
relationships have evolved between the supply chain players. As a result, the supply chain is 
characterised by high inventory levels, delays and queues which perhaps could be lessened if 
the players would work together instead of competing for capacity so intensely through 
destructive political and economic relationships. This paper proposes Agency Theory and 
other organisational theories as the means of achieving more collaborative relationships 
between supply chain players and hence much greater supply efficiencies to the collective 
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The objective of supply chain management is to focus on improving the efficiency of inter-
organisational supply relationships as a whole from source to customer with particular emphasis 
on the interfaces of the different operations in the supply chain.  The belief is that by partners in 
the supply chain all focusing on the same goals (E.g. deliver goods to the customer at the overall 
lowest cost or fastest rate); they will streamline their processes by eliminating duplication, 
improving communications and maybe even adjusting their operations to better serve the greater 
good of the supply chain.  This may mean that some partners may incur greater costs or require 
higher investments, but a collaborative supply chain will ensure all partners share appropriately 
in the overall gains made.  As one can appreciate, a successful supply chain requires a significant 
amount of trust to exist between partners for them to collaborate in such a transparent manner.  It 
could be a real challenge to introduce these concepts into a business environment where 
adversarial relationships between supply chain entities have traditionally dominated. 
 
The work described here focuses on the supply chain of coal from the coal mines in the Hunter 
Valley region in New South Wales, Australia, via trucks or rail to the port in Newcastle (Port 
Waratah Coal Services, PWCS), where it is exported to customers world wide.  This work will 
focus on the relationships between the supply chain partners and investigate the application of 
agency-theory and other theories to model the behaviour of the partners in the supply chain. 
 
THE HUNTER VALLEY COAL CHAIN 
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The partners in the supply chain are the 30 coal mines in the region, the transport services 
providers that transport the coal from the mines to the port (truck and rail), the government body 
that owns the rail infrastructure and the port operations that stockpile and then load the coal onto 
the ships to be delivered to the overseas customers. In a growing export market for Australian 
coal, there is considerable competition for port and transport infrastructure between the coal 
suppliers (the mines). As a result, considerable destructive rivalry has traditionally evolved 
between the various supply chain players as they compete for insufficient capacity in mine to port 
rail links, port stock piling, loading and shipping berths. The result is that the infrastructure is not 
equitably managed as the coal suppliers struggle to control sufficient rail, road and port facilities 
to allow them to deliver their product to their customers. The power, political and economic 
relationships inevitably dominate decision making and equity within the supply chain and hence 
the supply chain is beset with queues and extraordinarily high waiting times for many of the 
players. E.g. it is not unusual to find over 30 very large bulk carrying ships at anchor waiting off 
shore for a loading berth and many thousands of tonnes of coal stockpiled and waiting to be 
loaded at both the mines and the port. 
 
In 2003, a cooperative logistics planning team, the Hunter Valley Coal Chain (HVCC), the first 
of its kind in Australia, was established by members of the various corporate and government 
organisations involved in the transportation of the coal to the port in an attempt to develop more 
collaborative relationships. According to their website, the Hunter Valley Coal Chain, HVCC, is the 
largest coal export operation in the world and consists of: 
o 30 coal mines owned by 17 individual coal producers  
o 23 points for loading coal onto trains  
o Approximately 28 trains making more than two trips per day  
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o More than 80 different export blends of coal  
o Five coal berths and ship loaders and approximately 1.5 million tonnes of useable 
stockpile space at the port  
(Each of these entities constitutes the supply chain players.) 
 
Even though improvements have been achieved since the establishment of the HVCC, continued 
demand for greater throughput at the port still remains.  The coal producers are paying millions of 
dollars in demurrage costs due to ships having to queue and wait for their turn to be loaded.  The 
complicating factors are the many organisations involved and the complex ownership and 
business relationships between the entities.  To make matters worse, small coal producers are 
emerging wanting to cash in on the current business environment and these operators also need 
access to the existing port facilities. 
 
A recent development to this supply chain is a new structure to better manage the capacity 
constraints.  As of 2010, PWCS will enter into long-term contracts with the coal producers and 
these contracts will in turn support the investment required to meet the projected demand 
increase.  Plans are already in place that could potentially double the capacity of the port.  The 
HVCC will be established as a stand alone company, called the HVCCC (Hunter Valley Coal 
Chain Coordinator), and will continue to manage the day-to-day scheduling of trains and ships as 
well as support long-term planning of infrastructure projects to increase capacity.  They will be 
responsible for ensuring all contract obligations by PWCS are met.  
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The challenge to the managers of this new arrangement, who will become a board consisting of a 
representatives from all of the supply chain players,  is to create a truly effective collaborative 
arrangements and to overcome the negative effects of the destructive adversarial supply 
relationships established over previous generations. In an attempt to achieve this, the authors are 
investigating potential application basically consisting of Agency theory; whereby cooperative 
relationships are built between the supply chain players by establishing a collaborative principal 
and agent structure. They aim to achieve this by freeing up regulation of the infrastructure and 
committing long term capacity contracts to the coal suppliers, who will inturn be able to trade 
their contracted capacity on an as needs basis. In return for the long term commitments, 
government and supply chain partners will collaboratively commit over two billion dollars for 
upgrading of the infrastructure over the 10 year period of the contracts. In so doing, it is 
envisaged that all of the players will develop a long term interest in the efficient and profitable 
operation of the infrastructure facilities. 
 
AGENCY THEORY AND OTHER APPLICABLE ORGANISATIONAL THEORIES 
 
The aim of this research is to apply relevant organisational theories to the above case study.  In 
particular, Agency Theory and Social Exchange Theory are relevant to the case but other 
theoretical approaches will also be investigated. 
 
Agency theory relates to business relationships that consist of a “principal” and an “agent” who 
are engaged in cooperative behaviour, but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk.  
The mechanism for controlling the relationship is the contract between the principal and the agent 
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and, depending on the situation; the contract will be behaviour-based or outcome-based.  The 
heart of principal-agent theory is the trade-off between the cost of measuring behaviour and the 
cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt 1989).   
 
Social Exchange Theory on the other hand, focuses on the interactive relationships between 
partners (Qiu 2007) and considers material as well as non-material exchanges.  Reciprocity of 
explicit and implicit rewards in Social Exchange Theory forms the basis for fairness research.  
The 3 types of fairness provide a good platform for analysing the relationships in the HVCC:  
Distributive (input v output), Procedural (impartiality, consistency and refutability) and 
Interactive (informal interactions, decision justifications and truthfulness)  (Qiu 2007).  Griffith et 
al (2006) found how perceived procedural and distributive justice improved the performance of a 
distributor in a supply chain context. 
 
Research into Supply Chain Collaboration may also be applicable to the HVCC.  Extensive case 
study research in other industries into defining collaboration as a function of levels of 
information sharing, decision synchronisation and incentive alignment between supply chain 
partners has proven to be related to supply chain performance in terms of fulfilment, inventory 
and supply chain responsiveness (Simatupang and Sridharan 2005). 
 
Furthermore, Social Network Analysis (Carter, Ellram et al. 2007) might prove a suitable method 
to determine the dynamics of the inter-actions between the actors in the coal chain.  
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Table 1 below compares the differences, strengths and weaknesses under a number of parameters 
of the three theories on which this research is based. The strongest emphasis for this work was 
placed on Principal Agent Theory with some consideration of Social Exchange Theory to cover 
perceived deficiencies in Principal Agent Theory. 
  Transaction Cost 
Analysis (TCA) 
Principal Agent Theory 
(PAT)











The Focus of 
Relationship 
Inter-org relationshipsPA relationships Inter-org/intra-org 
relationships 
The Nature of 
Relationship 
Transactional Transactional Relational 
The Focus of 
Analysis 
Efficiency from the 
buyer’s perspective 










Determination of the most 
efficient contract 
The impact of reward 
expectations on attitudes or 
behaviours 
The Role of the 
Relationship 
Partners 
Ignore the individual 
diff’s among partners
Take into account the 
individual diff’s among 
partners 
Focus on the individual diff 
among partners 
The Key Issues Transaction costs Agency costs Rewards of interaction 
The Stage of 
Relationship 
Examined 
Ex post transaction 
cost minimisation 
Ex ante agency cost 
minimisation 




Vertical integration or 
not 
Outcome-based / behaviour-




Table 1: Comparison of three theories 
Basically, the decision on research methodology was based on the following views: TCA 
addresses channel dependence relationships by emphasising the channel member’s cost 
minimisation efforts. PAT provides guidelines in how to design incentive packages to achieve 
efficient relationships. SET models relationship fairness in light of the reciprocity rule. In view of 
established priorities in the case study, PAT and SET were considered priorities and to some 
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extent, it was thought that TCA was not necessarily and last likely to be aligned with goals of 
collaboration and cooperation. 
RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study is to understand and explain the nature of the relationships that exist in 
the Hunter Valley Coal Chain and how they relate to business outcomes and, in doing so, answer 
the following question: 
 
“Could Agency behaviour and enhanced social exchange positively affect the performance of the 
Hunter Valley Coal Chain?” 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The method used to analyse the supply chain partner relationships is a survey by conducting in-
depth interviews to gather as much information as possible.  The methodology defined by Yin 
(2009) and Cavana (2001) for case study research is utilised.  The details of the survey are to be 
published elsewhere and will be discussed in the conference presentation. Basically, the survey 
attempts to discover attitudes towards collaboration in the supply chain, in terms of information 
sharing in relation to their individual on-going infrastructure capacity needs, costs and attitudes to 
partners. It then goes on to investigate the likelihood of establishing agency behaviour and social 
exchange theory between the different partners, enquiring about the level of self interest in the 
individual players and whether they are culturally inclined to put that before the efficient 
utilisation of the supply chain infrastructure. Particular attention is paid to supply chain players' 
views on prioritising their overall costs, customer satisfaction and inventory levels. Data 
gathering is on-going and is to be obtained by interviewing executives and directors at the highest 
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level who drive the decision making process concerned with becoming involved in the supply 
chain coordinator venture within the individual supply chain players' firms. (In obtaining this 




Study of the supply chain organisation has been extremely difficult due to a high degree of 
instability in the organisation and it is important to understand that this study is of a dynamic 
situation as the new initiative is evolving. On occasions, it appears that key organisational factors 
have not remained constant from one day to the next. For example, one of the key drivers of the 
new initiative was the support of the government minister responsible for the port infrastructure, 
the port being a key player and stakeholder. Unfortunately, the initiative lost some momentum 
when the minister was removed from his position his position for political reasons not connected 
to the HVCC. However, the initial results are interesting in that there appears to be a strong 
culture of mistrust, even between the players' representatives in the HVCC organisation. One 
reason for this appears to be that the coordinator organisation managing executives are (were) 
from one of the large mining companies, Rio Tinto, who are a major user and part owner of the 
supply chain infrastructure. This executive team was appointed for no other reason than they had 
the necessary management, scheduling and optimisation supply chain skills and Rio Tinto 
provided much of the initial support for the project. However, such was the level of mistrust 
among the other partners that it became politically unacceptable for them to remain and a new 
executive team had to be created. This left the research in something of an impasse but in the 
meantime, further information gathering and development of the hypotheses was planned with 
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key new personnel at the new HVCCC. However, in accordance with Qui, 2007, the authors have 
found that the 3 types of fairness provide a good platform for analysing the relationships in the 
HVCC:  Distributive (input v output), Procedural (impartiality, consistency and refutability) and 
Interactive (informal interactions, decision justifications and truthfulness) are all key factors in 




It appears that there may be considerable barriers to the establishment of meaningful Principal-
Agent relationships in the studied supply organisation. Initial indications suggest that most of 
these barriers result from a culture of mistrust, politics and self interest that have been established 
over many years where partners are competing for capacity intensely through destructive political 
and economic relationships. It is clear that unequal power relationships and political priorities in 
conflict with individual business goals are at play. This work is continuing and will begin to 
focus on proposals to build a culture of trust and collaboration between major supply chain 
players with the goal of achieving improved supply chain efficiencies, based on Agency 
relationships. In accordance with Griffith et al (2006) it is strongly believed that perceived 
procedural and distributive justice could enhance the performance of this supply chain by 
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